Actually, what {Dudley} said in footnote five of that speech was that you could make a case that the Fed should have moved faster. That’s what he said, he didn’t sort of say that it was a mistake.
Interesting question. I frankly think anyone who says the way we did things before the crisis, we probably should have done them differently, you’re going to get a hearing on any -- any idea of that, that sounds like that. And this is one of those, it’s absolutely worthwhile look at that.
I -- so the real question is, would that have made a -- if the Fed had moved, you know, in a less measured way, measured pace, would that have made a big difference in the financial crisis? And I think the answer is clearly no.
You know, you had a -- you had a housing bubble that was kind of self-contained, it was kind of expectations of market participants, buyers and sellers that housing was always going to go up, up, up, up, there’s no such thing as housing prices going down. You had a bubble, and that happened.
I think the mistakes that were made before the crisis, were much more about regulation, supervision, and really, just imagination. You know, no one thought -- very few people saw this coming. Very few people thought this was coming.